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INTRODUCTION
When a state's highest court holds that strict liability is the
applicable standard for a design defect claim in the face of a statute
that expressly requires a negligence standard, the holding needs to be
brought out into the sunlight for all to see. 1  The Washington
Supreme Court did so hold two years ago, in the case of Soproni v.
Polygon Apartment Partners.2 The Soproni case was not the first occa-
sion on which such a proposition was stated.' Twice now the state
supreme court has construed the Washington Product Liability Act
(WPLA)4 to apply strict liability to defective design and defective
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., 1994, Southern Oregon
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friends and colleagues on the Law Review, and to my future associate, Michael P. Hooks, for his
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1. Strict liability has been defined in the following manner:
When a court imposes 'strict liability' on a defendant, it is saying that the defendant
must pay damages although the defendant neither intentionally injured plaintiff nor
failed to live up to the objective standard of reasonable care that traditionally has been
at the root of negligence law. Some courts and textwriters call this process "absolute
liability".... [O]ther textwriters and courts [define it as] "liability without fault."
PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 664 (John W. Wade
et al. eds., 9th ed. 1994). As usual, Dean Prosser's observation hits the nail on the head:
Once the legal concept of "fault" is divorced, as it has been, from the personal
standard of moral wrongdoing, there is a sense in which liability with or without
"fault" must beg its own conclusion. The term requires such extensive definition, that
it seems better not to make use of it at all, and to refer instead to strict liability, apart
from either wrongful intent or negligence.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 538 (5th ed. 1984).
2. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 330, 971 P.2d 500, 507
(1999).
3. See, e.g., Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 654, 782 P.2d 974, 980 (1989);
Anderson v. Weslo, Inc., 79 Wash. App. 829, 836, 906 P.2d 336, 340 (1995).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010-060 (2000).
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warning product liability claims made under the statute. The first
occasion arose in 1989 in the case of Falk v. Keene Corp.' To the
extent that the statutory construction observed in the Soproni case has
already been seen in the Falk opinion, this Note should be read as a
critical appraisal of that case as well. To a large extent, however, the
Soproni case is the more appropriate of the two cases to discuss; it is
more recent, contains virtually undisputed facts, and better illustrates
the implications for product manufacturers doing business in
Washington.
In Part I, this Note will discuss the peculiar procedural history
behind Soproni. What began at the trial court as a strong case against
the first two defendants underwent a change in strategy involving the
joinder of a third defendant, Alpine Windows, and a summary judg-
ment for all defendants. The case then followed an appellate path that
resulted in the exoneration of the first two defendants, settlement with
Alpine Windows on the eve of trial, and a subsequent bankruptcy for
Alpine.6 Part I will also closely examine the WPLA, beginning with a
discussion of the tort reform context in which it was enacted and the
underlying economic reasons for its passage in 1981. This section will
discuss how the WPLA ostensibly supplanted Washington common
law on product liability, as well as what a careful reading of the statute
seems to dictate for litigating product liability claims.
The reader will then learn how the Soproni majority construed
the statute and how the statute was constructed by Falk a decade earli-
er. Although the Soproni story finally came to a conclusion in the
summer of 2000,' the surprising chapter authored by five Justices of
the state supreme court occupies the heart of this Note in Part I.D.
Finally, this Note will explore the consequences of the Soproni deci-
sion for window manufacturers doing business in Washington, partic-
ularly the "Catch 22" situation produced when manufacturers design
to prevent liability to one class of plaintiffs (children) only to create
liability to another class (the elderly).
5. 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989).
6. Associated Materials Acquires Alpine Window Facility, PR Newswire, Oct. 9, 2000,
available in LEXIS, PRNEWS file.
7. In June 2000, the defendant window manufacturer, Alpine Windows, settled with the
plaintiffs for an undisclosed sum, just days before the jury trial was to commence. Telephone
interview with Paul Whelan, Plaintiffs Attorney, in Seattle, Wash. (June 2000). One month
later, Alpine and its parent company, Reliant Building Products, Inc., filed a voluntary petition
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Associated Materials Acquires Alpine
Windows Facility, supra note 6.
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I. THE CASE, THE LAW, AND HOW THE WASHINGTON SUPREME
COURT APPLIED ONE TO THE OTHER
A. The Facts of Soproni v. Polygon
In the late summer of 1993, 20-month-old Daniel Soproni and
his mother Shannon were visiting with Jeff Elsworth, Shannon's adult
friend, at his apartment in Federal Way, Washington.' Shannon, Jeff,
and Daniel were all together in the upstairs bedroom. 9 The bed on
which Daniel was playing had been placed adjacent to the bedroom's
only window, a wide horizontal sliding aluminum-frame design.'"
This window was fitted into a recessed "pop-out configuration,"'"
providing the outside of the apartment building some architectural
relief, as well as providing the occupants with a wide internal window-
sill thirty-four inches above the floor.'2 Thus, the particular dimen-
sions and architectural design of the bedroom window served to offer
the apartment's occupants the possibility of designating this a "win-
dow seat."' 3
Nonetheless, Jeff Elsworth had arranged his bedroom furniture
so as not to avail himself of this added feature. 4 Rather, the bed was
situated with the head alongside the windowsill, such that Daniel
could quite easily move from the bed to the ledge of the window."
This is exactly what little Daniel discovered that day, and his focus
quickly turned to the fateful window, which was open approximately
two inches. 6 The resourceful toddler learned how to slide the window
open, and played with the window by opening and closing it. 7 This
8. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416, 417-18, 941 P.2d 707, 708
(1997).
9. Id. at 418, 941 P.2d at 708.
10. See Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 323 971 P.2d 500, 503
(1999). For specific details about the window, see Exhibit 2 to Alpine Windows Motion for
Summary Judgment, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-2-
21507-8).
11. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 322, 971 P.2d at 502.
12. Id. "The interior window ledge measured 16 1/2 inches in width, sufficient to
accommodate an ordinary sitting adult." Declaration of Dr. Gary Sloan in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 1 11, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners
(Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-2-21507-8).
13. Declaration of Dr. Gary Sloan in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment 11, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-2-21507-
8).
14. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 323, 971 P.2d at 503.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 322, 971 P.2d at 502; Brief of Appellants at 4, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment
Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416, 941 P.2d 707 (1997) (No. 38011-7-I).
17. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 322, 971 P.2d at 502.
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soon attracted the attention of his mother and Jeff, who repeatedly
closed the window and scolded the child not to play with it."s Unfor-
tunately, Daniel was not sufficiently dissuaded from the object of his
play. While no one was paying close attention, Daniel again opened
the window, but this time he decided to lean back against the screen. 19
Just when Daniel's mother noticed this and stood up to retrieve him
from the windowsill, the screen gave way and Daniel fell onto the
patio below, sustaining severe head injuries and long-term neurolog-
ical impairment.2"
B. The Lawsuit: Whom to Sue for Negligence and the
Afterthought of Products Liability
One year later, Shannon Soproni2" brought suit against Polygon
Apartment Partners, the developer/owner of the apartment complex,
for negligence.22  In its answer, Polygon asserted an affirmative
defense of contribution, stating that if it were found to be at fault, then
the architect and the window manufacturer should also be found com-
paratively at fault." Consequently, Soproni amended her complaint to
allege that Polygon, Millbrandt Architects, and Alpine Windows were"negligent and in violation of safety rules and regulations, including
the applicable building code and laws of the [State of Washington] .24
Interestingly, it still had not occurred to the plaintiffs to allege a vio-
lation of the WPLA.2" Indeed, having led all three defendants to
believe that "this was a case of simple negligence, and having in-
formed counsel for Alpine that it would not oppose Alpine's motion
for summary judgment, [the plaintiff] changed tactics."26 Essentially
presenting Alpine with what can fairly be described as a "moving
target,"" counsel for Soproni first mentioned the product liability
statute when opposing Alpine's motion for summary judgment.28 As
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. While Shannon Soproni was not the sole plaintiff, for ease of understanding she will be
referred to as "the plaintiff' throughout this Note. See Complaint, Soproni v. Polygon
Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-2-21507-8).
22. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416, 418, 941 P.2d 707, 708
(1997).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Brief of Respondent at 8, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416,
941 P.2d 707 (1997) (No. 38011-7-1) (citations omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9. See also Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. at 418, 941
P.2d at 708. "Plaintiffs bring this action against Alpine under the product liability statute,
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noted in the opinion by the Washington Court of Appeals for Divi-
sion I, counsel for Soproni "indicated that this really was not a switch
from negligence to strict liability, but negligence as couched by the
provisions of the product liability statute. .,2 The prophetic irony
of this argument will be fully appreciated in Part I.D of this Note.
Polygon, Milbrandt, and Alpine each moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the building owner/manager, architect, and
window manufacturer had no legal duty to childproof the window and
screen to prevent this unfortunate accident.3" In support of its motion
for summary judgment, Alpine submitted affidavits and declarations
of two experts: Tom King, who attested to the window's full compli-
ance with the applicable building and fire codes,3" and Dennis Barbee,
Alpine's Supervisor of Research and Development Engineering.32 Mr.
Barbee emphasized that these same codes and standards require that
windows located in residential sleeping rooms "provide a 'full clear
opening without the use of separate tools,' with a minimum 'operable
width dimension of 20 inches."' 33 This is because the windows of
sleeping rooms must provide for emergency escape in the event of a
fire, and such escape should not be too difficult for elderly persons or
small children.34
The window was also equipped with a sliding detent, or bolt,
which sank vertically into a recessed hole in the window track.3" This
detent could be used to keep the window at two settings: completely
closed and open by about three inches, both of which kept the window
from sliding laterally.36 As for the screen, Mr. Barbee stated that the
purpose of a window screen is clearly not to prevent residents from
RCW 7.72.030,..." Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Alpine's Motion for Summary
Judgment of Dismissal at 3, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No.
94-2-21507-8).
29. Soproni, 88 Wash. App. at 418, 941 P.2d at 708.
30. Brief of Respondent at 4, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416,
941 P.2d 707 (1997) (No. 38011-7-I). Alpine did not design or manufacture the screen. See
Affidavit of Dennis Barbee 4, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995)
(No. 94-2-21507-8).
31. Brief of Respondent at 4-5, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App.
416, 941 P.2d 707 (1997) (No. 38011-7-I). "The [Alpine] Series 220 window involved in this
case met or exceeded all standards promulgated by [the Uniform Building Code, the National
Fire Protection Association Codes, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards,
and industry standards promulgated by the American Architectural Manufacturers Association
(AAMA)]." Id.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. (quoting CP 194).
34. See id.
35. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 322, 971 P.2d 500, 502
(1999).
36. Id.
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falling through them, but rather to keep insects outside when the win-
dow is open. 7
In opposition to Alpine's motion for summary judgment,
Soproni offered the testimony of two of its own experts: Stan Mitch-
ell, a Washington architect,38 and Dr. Gary Sloan, a psychologist and
human factors/ergonomics specialist.39 In contrast to the expert testi-
mony adduced by Alpine, which related primarily to the applicable
building and fire codes in manufacturing the window, Messrs. Mitch-
ell and Sloan provided legally conclusory opinions to the effect that the"window in question was not reasonably safe,"4 that safer alternatives
were available,41 and that such a window would be employed in this
type of situation was foreseeable." Mr. Mitchell proceeded to become
an expert on consumer expectations, declaring that "the design [of the
window] does not meet the consumer expectation of safety, '4 3 echoing
almost verbatim the statutory language found in the WPLA.44
Drawing from his architectural expertise, Mr. Mitchell suggested that
Alpine could have offered feasibly safe alternatives such as a "case-
ment window ... opened by a hand crank, a keyless locking barrier, a
thumb screw locking detent and/or a double hung window which only
opened from the top down."4" Such alternatives, Mr. Mitchell opined,"would 'probably have prevented this accident."' 46 Indeed, the devel-
oper would have bought such a window if it had been sold for the
37. Brief of Respondent at 6, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416,
941 P.2d 707 (1997) (No. 38011-7-I).
38. Declaration of Stan Mitchell in Opposition to the Defendant Alpine Windows' Motion
for Summary Judgment 2, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No.
94-2-21507-8).
39. Exhibit 4 to Declaration of Dr. Gary Sloan in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-
2-21507-8).
40. Declaration of Stan Mitchell in Opposition to the Defendant Alpine Windows' Motion
for Summary Judgment 5, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No.
94-2-21507-8).
41. Id. at 4.
42. See Declaration of Dr. Gary Sloan in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment at 18, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No.
94-2-21507-8).
43. Declaration of Stan Mitchell in Opposition to the Defendant Alpine Windows' Motion
for Summary Judgment 5, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No.
94-2-21507-8).
44. Section 7.72.030(3) of the WPLA reads: "In determining whether a product was not
reasonably safe under this section, the trier of fact shall consider whether the product was unsafe
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.72.030(3) (2000).
45. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 324, 971 P.2d 500, 503
(1999) (quoting CP at 265-66).
46. Id. (quoting CP at 264).
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same price.47 It is troubling that the developer knew about safer
alternative window designs and nonetheless chose not to buy one,
especially in light of the fact that Alpine had no knowledge that its
product would be installed in a second-floor bedroom.
Interestingly, Dr. Sloan opined that it was the "combination of
features of this bedroom window such as sill/seat height and depth,
the easy access thereto by furniture or the 9-inch high baseboard
heater and the non-childproof, non-latchable sliding window [that]
presented a risk of serious harm to small children such as Daniel
Soproni. ' '48 Dr. Sloan's opinion would seem to implicate defendants
Milbrandt, the architect, and Polygon, the owner/developer, to the
extent the features for which Alpine was responsible would seem least
relevant, and presumably make Alpine less subject to liability for
Daniel's injuries. Dr. Sloan also testified the window should have
been equipped with a childproof barrier or lockout to prevent opening
more than 4.5 inches.49
With the mere existence of such differences in expert opinion
serving as the backdrop behind its newly discovered product liability"
case against Alpine, the plaintiff repeatedly argued that only the jury
could resolve the question of liability in the case.51 Pointing to the
statutory language "reasonably safe,.". "likelihood that the product
would cause.., harm,"" "seriousness of ... harm[], ' ' 4 "burden on
the manufacturer," 5 and "contemplated by the ordinary consumer, '"56
the plaintiff maintained that summary judgment was not proper.5 7
However, the premise underlying that argument was laid bare by its
own advocate: "the very nature of a product liability claim [renders]
47. Id.
48. Declaration of Dr. Gary Sloan in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment 18, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-2-21507-
8).
49. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 324, 971 P.2d at 503.
50. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the product liability statute "provides for liability
when a product is not reasonably safe as designed.., when a product is not reasonably safe for
lack of adequate warnings." Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Alpine's Motion for
Summary Judgment of Dismissal at 3, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct.
1995) (No. 94-2-21507-8).
51. Id. at 3-6.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1) (2000).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a),(b).
54. Id.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(3).
57. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Alpine's Motion for Summary
Judgment of Dismissal at 5, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No.
94-2-21507-8).
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summary judgment... rarely appropriate,"" insofar as the statute
giving rise thereto necessitates the determination of "questions of
fact." 9  Thus, applying the plaintiffs approach to product liability
litigation, the expert opinions of Messrs. Mitchell and Sloan are but a
procedural formality standing between a complaint and a jury trial.
Rejecting such an approach, the trial court concluded that no genuine
issue existed as to facts material to plaintiffs claims, dismissing all
three defendants.6"
C. The Appeal: Exonerating the Responsible Parties
1. The Appellate Strategy
The plaintiff did not appeal from the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to the architect and the developer, despite the fact that
those parties made the crucial decision to design and construct the
window in a "pop-out" configuration and place it in a second-floor
apartment bedroom.61 Instead, recognizing that de novo review of the
product liability based summary judgment stood a better chance of
reversal,6 Soproni gambled that the appellate court would find the
disputed expert testimony important evidence that could only be
resolved by a jury.63 Soproni argued on appeal that because Alpine
sold an alternative design of window with a "furled knob type detent
[that] could not be easily opened by a child,"64 and that because Mr.
Mitchell testified that the "safety hazards associated with the win-
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. Relying on the annotations to ORLAND & LEWIS TEGLAND, 4 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE: RULES § 37 at 634-37, the plaintiff argued that this conclusion is compelled by the
fact that "virtually every summary judgment product liability case" was held to present "jury
questions." Id.
60. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. at 416, 418, 941 P.2d at 702,
708; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (6th ed. 1990) ("Genuine issues... are issues
which can be sustained by substantial evidence"); Gregory A. Gordillo, Summary Judgment and
Problems in Applying the Celotex Trilogy Standard, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 263, 264 (1994)
("Stated simply, a material fact is one which will affect the outcome of the case, and a material
fact raises a genuine issue if a reasonable jury could reach different conclusions concerning that
fact.").
61. Soproni, 88 Wash. App. at 418, 941 P.2d at 708. "This exoneration of the architect
and builder is troublesome precisely because ... [they] chose to place this window behind a 16-
1/2 inch recessed ledge." Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 332, 971
P.2d 500, 507 (1999) (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. See generally Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Alpine's Motion for Summary
Judgment of Dismissal, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1995) (No. 94-
2-21507-8).
63. See Brief of Appellants at 1, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App.
416, 941 P.2d 707 (1997) (No. 38011-7-I).
64. Id. at 5.
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dow... could have been designed out with feasible safer alternative
designs.... the Alpine window in question was not reasonably
safe... "65 In sum, Soproni regurgitated its experts' opinion testi-
mony that "reasonable steps should have been taken by [Alpine] to
design out the risk by using a feasible alternative childproof design
employing a locking device."66
In response to Soproni's contention that due to the nature of a
product liability claim "summary judgment is rarely if ever appropri-
ate,"67 the Washington Court of Appeals for Division I stated:
"[w]hile we have doubts that Soproni adequately pleaded this case
under the product liability act, we will review it on that basis. We
hold that even if viewed as a case under the act, it can be decided as a
matter of law."68
2. The Washington Product Liability Act:
The Negligence Standard
After nearly two years of extensive hearings and public debates
in the Washington legislature concerning the implementation of broad
tort reform, the WPLA was enacted in 1981.69 The chief reason for
the WPLA's passage was the abrupt increase in product liability
insurance premiums, as noted in the statute's preamble:
The purpose of this amendatory act is to enact further reforms
in the tort law to create a fairer and more equitable distribution
of liability among parties at fault.
Of particular concern is the area of tort law known as product
liability law. Sharply rising premiums for product liability
insurance have increased the cost of consumer and industrial
goods. These increases in premiums have resulted in disincen-
tives to industrial innovation and the development of new prod-
ucts. High product liability premiums may encourage product
sellers and manufacturers to go without liability insurance or
pass the high cost of insurance on to the consuming public in
general.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id. at 13.
68. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416, 419, 941 P.2d 707, 708
(1997).
69. See WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT & PRODUCT
LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 1-2 (1981). See also Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 27, 1981
Wash. Laws 112. For an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the WPLA and the
various contemporary economic, social, and political issues that led to its passage, see Philip A.
Talmadge, Washington's Product Liability Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1981).
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It is the intent of the legislature to treat the consuming public,
the product seller, the product manufacturer, and the product
liability insurer in a balanced fashion in order to deal with these
problems.
It is the intent of the legislature that the right of the consumer to
recover for injuries sustained as a result of an unsafe product not
be unduly impaired. It is further the intent of the legislature
that retail businesses located primarily in the state of Washing-
ton be protected from the substantially increasing product
liability insurance costs and unwarranted exposure to product
liability litigation.7"
Before the WPLA, claimants seeking redress for product-related
injuries could avail themselves of various legal theories of liability:
negligence, warranty, contract, and strict liability, for example.71
With the enactment of the WPLA, the confusion commonly associ-
ated with litigating product liability claims amidst these differing legal
theories and standards was significantly reduced by the creation of a
single cause of action for product-related harms.72 The WPLA sup-
planted previously existing common law remedies, including common
law actions for negligence, and expressly defined the standards of
liability to be applied in defective design, defective warning, and
defective construction claims.73 The statute now provides that a"product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claim-
ant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer
in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed or not reasonably
safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided."74 The
statute goes on to provide that:
70. Act of Apr. 17, 1981,ch. 27, 1981 Laws 112, at 112-13.
71. WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT & PRODUCT
LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT at 16 (1981). For a thorough study of the development of
strict products liability, which arose in the early 1960s, see generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 641-82 (4th ed. 1971). Its creation grew largely out of a
jurisprudential movement to adjust conventional tort and warranty theories in order to facilitate
recovery for consumers injured by defective products, regardless of the degree of care on the part
of the manufacturer in making the product. Id. at 656-58.
72. WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT & PRODUCT
LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 16 (1981). See also Celia E. Holuk & Donna L. Walker,
Comment, Products Liability-Tort Reform: An Overview of Washington's New Act, 17 GONZ.
L. REV. 357 (1982); Comment, Product Liability Reform Proposals in Washington A Public
Policy Analysis, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143 (1980).
73. WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT & PRODUCT
LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 16-17 (1981); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030
(2000).
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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A product is not reasonably safe as designed, if, at the time of
manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those
harms, outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a
product that would have prevented those harms and the adverse
effect that an alternative design that was practical and feasible
would have on the usefulness of the product. . .. "
However, a "product manufacturer is subject to strict liability to a
claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the fact
that the product was not reasonably safe in construction or not reasonably
safe because it did not conform to the manufacturer's express warranty or
to the implied warranties under Title 62A RCW."76  Finally, "in
determining whether a product was not reasonably safe under this
section, the trier of fact shall consider whether the product was unsafe
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer. 77
Clearly then, strict liability was reserved as the appropriate
standard for defective construction and warranty claims, while negli-
gence was deemed more appropriate for defective design and defective
warning claims.7" In its final report, the state senate Select Committee
on Tort & Product Liability Reform noted that this new law "reflects
essentially a negligence standard in design and warning/instruction
cases, and agrees with the UPLA79 that the 'application of uncertain
strict liability principles in the areas of design and duty to warn places
a whole product line at risk; therefore a firmer liability foundation is
needed.'"' The negligence standard was codified to provide that
"firmer liability foundation."'" Thus, reading the above statutory pro-
visions together, a product liability claimant alleging defective design
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2) (emphasis added).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(3).
78. See WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT & PRODUCT
LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 16-18 (1981).
79. At the national level, a legal study of product liability reform was commissioned by the
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. Id. at IS. This pre-WPLA study resulted in the
development of a Model Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA) by the U.S. Department of
Commerce Task Force on Product Liability and Accident Compensation, which criticized the
lack of uniformity among jurisdictions in the standards used to analyze product liability claims.
Id. The Select Committee's "final proposal... closely adheres to [the UPLA's] approaches, if
not its precise language." Id. at 15-16.
80. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 18. Dean Prosser, in discussing the so-called "risk-utility" test, which is
essentially what was codified in RCW 7.72.030(1)(a), concluded that "even though it may
occasionally be called strict [liability], [it] appears to rest primarily upon a departure from proper
standards of care, so that the tort is essentially a matter of negligence." PROSSER, supra note 71,
at 644.
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and/or warning would seem to be required to show (1) that a product-
related injury was proximately caused by the negligence of the manu-
facturer, (2) that the product was not reasonably safe, (3) that a bal-
ancing of the risk/burden factors of subparagraph (1)(a) of the WPLA
weighs in the claimant's favor, and (4) that the ordinary consumer's
expectations have been considered in the determination of step three.12
A claimant alleging defective manufacture or breach of warranty, on the
other hand, need not show negligence by the manufacturer, because
the "manufacturer is subject to strict liability" for such a claim. 3
3. The Analysis by the Washington Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Alpine Windows and dismissed the appellant's sugges-
tion that product liability actions and summary judgment are generally
mutually exclusive.8 4 The court stated that "under the facts of a par-
ticular case, 'it may be unreasonable for a consumer to expect product
design to depart from ... regulatory standards, even if to do so would
result in a safer product."'85 Certainly, it is within the province of a
trial court judge to determine whether a reasonable jury could reach
different conclusions as to what is within the contemplation of an ordi-
nary consumer. Almost any product could cause injury if put to
certain uses, but it would be unreasonable for a consumer to expect to
avoid injury when putting products to all conceivable uses.86 The
court then stated that the affidavits of Messrs. Mitchell and Sloan did
not show that the product was unsafe within the ordinary consumer's
expectation.8 7 After all, a window is for "light, air, and egress in case
of fire [, and] [t]he window here has not been shown to be 'unsafe,'
only that another window design might... be safer.... ."8
82. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1),(3); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137
Wash. 2d 319, 336, 971 P.2d 500, 510 (1999) (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability:
The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1264, 1268 (1992) ("Prior to 1981, when the
Washington state legislature took products liability law into its own, defense oriented, hands,
Washington's strict liability law essentially embodied Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.[, 525
P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974),] ... [and the WPLA] effectively brought negligence concepts into failure
to warn [and] design defect cases.").
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
84. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 88 Wash. App. 416, 421-23, 941 P.2d 707,
709-10 (1997).
85.- Id. at 421, 941 P.2d at 709 (quoting Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 655, 782
P.2d 974, 980 (1989)).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 422, 941 P.2d at 710.
88. Id. at 421, 941 P.2d at 709-10.
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Turning to the appellant's contention that the dispute between
its experts and those of the defense unearthed genuine issues of mater-
ial fact, the court found the former to contain "conclusions and
assumptions not fully supported within the context of standards for
summary judgments." 9 Those standards require that declarations set
forth specific facts, "not mere speculation or conjecture."9 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court.9
D. The Washington Supreme Court's Divided Reversal
The Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review,
bringing before it the same arguments and assignments of error raised
in the court of appeals: summary judgment should not have been
granted, Soproni argued, due to the existence of disputed expert testi-
mony as to the consumer expectations and the feasibility of safer
alternative window designs.92 The court first disposed of Soproni's
contention that summary judgment was not proper on the defective
warning claim, finding that the record clearly established that the lack
of warnings did not contribute to the accident.93 Indeed, it was an
undisputed fact that Shannon Soproni was fully aware of the danger
presented by her son's playing with the window, by virtue of her own
warnings to Daniel to stop doing so. 94
The court then proceeded to parse the statute's design defect
provisions, applying the subversive and illogical textual construction
that lies at the heart of this Note. By a slim 5-4 decision, the court
reversed both lower courts' decisions and remanded the design defect
claim for trial.95 The reasoning employed by the court, and its reliance
on two key previous cases, one prior to and one subsequent to the
enactment of the WPLA,96 substitutes strict liability for the statute's
89. Id. at 422, 941 P.2d at 710.
90. Id.
91. Id. The appellants had assigned error to both the defective design claim and the failure
to warn claim, but the bulk of the court of appeals' opinion is devoted to the former. Id. The
failure to warn claim was affirmed with two sentences of reasoning: "Washington law holds that
a manufacturer has no duty to warn when the product user is aware of the risk .... 'A
manufacturer is not an insurer, and need not warn against hazards known to everyone."' Id. at
422-23, 941 P.2d at 710 (quoting Kimble v. Waste Sys. Int'l, 23 Wash. App. 331, 339, 595 P.2d
569, 573, review denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1029 (1979)).
92. Appellants' Petition for Review at 1-2, Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137
Wash. 2d 319, 917 P.2d 500 (1999) (No. 38011-7-I).
93. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 326, 971 P.2d 500, 504
(1999).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 331, 971 P.2d at 507.
96. The court relied on Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989), and
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
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negligence standard, gives short shrift to the principles of tort reform
that moved the legislature to enact the WPLA, and puts Washing-
ton's product manufacturers in the difficult position of assessing the
risk that their products will be deemed "defective" even when the
products perform as intended. This author respectfully submits that
the Soproni majority has removed all doubt concerning its conviction
that the WPLA is a "stain on the beauty of the common law,"97
demonstrating the degree to which the court pays undying homage to
the principle of stare decisis and gives short shrift to the principle of
judicial restraint.
Citing its opinion in Falk v. Keene Corp., the Soproni court held
that "strict liability is the applicable standard for a design defect product
liability claim maintained under RCW 7.72.030(2)." ''g As noted
above, the WPLA sets forth strict liability as the statutory standard
for manufacture defect or warranty claims, not for design defect claims.99
This is the majority's most egregious error of statutory construction,
for it renders the word "negligence" as used in the statute either
superfluous, that is, synonymous with "strict liability," or a drafting
mistake. The court then read the "risk-utility" test provision, found
in subparagraph (1)(a) of the WPLA,' ° as an optional method of
showing that a product is not reasonably safe as designed; the other
method being the "consumer expectations" test, found in subpara-
graph (3).1 As mentioned above, the language of subparagraph (3) of
the WPLA, "[i]n determining whether a product was not reasonably
safe under this section, the trier of fact shall consider. . clearly
presupposes that the risk-utility test of subparagraph (1)(a) will be
used." 3 Construing these two tests as optional schemes for defining
the phrase "not reasonably safe" renders the entire risk-utility test
language superfluous in those cases where claimants present the jury
with nothing but consumer expectations evidence. Rather, the con-
sumer expectations test should be seen as an "interpretive tool' ' 10 4 for
97. This is an apt expression described by the author's first-year torts professor, Richard
H. Seeburger, on a number of occasions. The original source of this saying could not be
determined.
98. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 326, 971 P.2d at 504 (second emphasis added).
99. WASH. REV. CODE§ 7.72.030(2) (2000).
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)(a).
101. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 326-27, 971 P.2d at 505.
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(3) (emphasis added).
103. See SENATE JOURNAL, 47th Legis. Sess. 631 (Wash. 1981) ("Factors examined under
[the risk-utility] balancing test are similar to those suggested by the Washington court in
analyzing the consumer expectation test, Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145
(1975), and therefore can be harmonized with the consumer expectation test. Thus, both tests
are adopted here as relevant considerations which the trier of fact should consider.").
104. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 333, 971 P.2d at 508, (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and
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analyzing the elements of the risk-utility test, the ultimate determina-
tion of whether a product should be deemed "not reasonably safe."
In response to the dissent's criticism of the majority's interpreta-
tion of the WPLA as "erroneous," the court confines its cursory
response to a footnote in which it does little more than remind the
dissent of the vaunted principle of stare decisis."' In fact, the majority
opinion inflates the significance, and ostensibly the soundness, of the
Falk court's holding by tracing its origin to a case decided before the
enactment of the WPLA, Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert.106
Falk v. Keene Corp., decided in 1989, involved a personal injury
action brought by the survivors of John Falk, who was exposed to
asbestos insulation products during service in the United States Navy
from 1947 to 1953.1°7 The complaint in Falk alleged both defective
design and failure to warn of the dangers associated with asbestos; a
jury verdict in favor of the defendants was reversed on appeal."' 8 The
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the court of appeals' reversal
on the grounds that the jury instructions regarding a claim that the
product was defectively designed, which defined negligence as "the
failure to exercise ordinary care,"109 constituted prejudicial error."0
The trial court in Falk instructed the jury on design defect product
liability in accordance with WPIC 110.02 (1984), using language
closely following that of subparagraphs 7.72.030(1), (1)(a), and (3) of
the WPLA."l The trial court also instructed the jury modeled on the
common-law definition of negligence, and the plaintiff objected.12
The plaintiff requested a pre-WPLA strict liability instruction in
accordance with the Tabert standard, but the trial court denied this
request." 3 Following a jury verdict for the manufacturers, the plaintiff
appealed." 4 The Washington Supreme Court held "that ordinary
negligence is not the standard adopted by the Legislature for deter-
mining manufacturer liability for defectively designed prod-
dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 327 n.3, 971 P.2d at 505 n.3.
106. Id. "Not only did Falk issue in 1989.... but we relied there on our holding in
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 149, 542 P.2d 774 (1975), a case in which
we held that a manufacturer is strictly liable for manufacturing an unreasonably dangerous and
therefore defective product." Id.
107. Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 646, 782 P.2d 974, 975-76 (1989).
108. Id. at 646, 648, 782 P.2d at 976.
109. Id. at 647 n.2, 782 P.2d at 976 n.2.
110. Id. at 660, 782 P.2d at 983.
111. Id. at 646-47, 782 P.2d at 976.
112. Id. at647, 782 P.2d at 976.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 647-48, 782 P.2d at 976.
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ucts. ... 11"5 The Falk court reasoned that because the WPLA
codified the consumer expectations and risk-utility analysis, which
were originally devised in the pre-WPLA Tabert case, the legislature's
use of the word "negligence" in the statute was simply acknowledging
that the balancing done in Tabert was more "'akin' to negligence.."116
The Falk court relied on a few fragments of legislative history to sup-
port this argument, essentially reducing tort reform to a matter of
semantics. Negligence and strict liability were interchangeable in the
statutory scheme of products liability in Washington. Thus, with
facts much less likely to arouse any great sympathy or interest in the
legal community, Falk could arguably be overlooked as an anomalous
but excusable distortion of the WPLA. However, the Soproni court
placed great reliance on Falk for its precedential value, such that
Falk's statutory construction must be critically appraised as well.
The Soproni court then purported to fortify the proposition for
which the Tabert case stands by citing a 1986 opinion, Baughn v.
Honda Motor Co.," 7 in which the court characterized Tabert as"widely recognized [as] a leading case in setting forth standards for
imposing strict liability for a defective product."'1 8 Such heavy reli-
ance on a single product liability case decided prior to the passage of
the WPLA, coupled with the citation to a case that followed that
statute, but did not construe it,1 19 speaks volumes about the Soproni
court's deference to legislative prerogative. Furthermore, that such
reasoning was employed in construing a statute that should have so
fundamentally changed product liability litigation in Washington
makes it difficult not to conclude that five members of the State
Supreme Court found the legislature's stance on tort reform, as codi-
fied in the WPLA, politically unpalatable.
As if to rebut such an accusation, the majority cited another
principle: "the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial inter-
pretations of its enactments and that its failure to amend a statute
following a judicial decision interpreting it indicates legislative acqui-
escence in that decision."2 Even three years after passage of the
WPLA, state legislators might have been forgiven for thinking the
supreme court was on board with the "firmer liability foundation"
115. Id. at 646, 782 P.2d at 976.
116. Id. at 653, 782 P.2d at 979.
117. 107 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655 (1986).
118. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash. 2d 319, 327, 971 P.2d 500, 505
(1999) (quoting Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 133-34, 727 P.2d at 659-60).
119. See Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d 127, 727 P.2d 655. Baughn was decided in 1986, five years
after the passage of the WPLA, but nonetheless involved a cause of action for injuries sustained
prior to the WPLA; the WPLA thus was inapplicable. See id.
120. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 327 n.3, 971 P.2d at 505 n.3.
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established by the statute. Justice Brachtenbach, writing for the
majority in Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co.,121 commented on the new
statute-which incidentally was not applicable to that case inasmuch as
the cause of action accrued prior to the enactment of the WPLA-by
stating:
One of the more significant changes adopted by the Legislature
was to change the standard of liability for design and warning/
instruction defects. The Legislature felt that the balancing fac-
tors announced in Tabert,122 and Teagle,123 had implicitly created
a negligence standard for strict liability causes of actions.
Therefore, the Legislature adopted negligence standards as the
standard of liability for design and warning/instruction defects
under the new act. 124
Justice Brachtenbach also authored the Falk opinion five years
later, but this time he ascribed to the legislature quite a different
intent:
Our conclusion that ordinary negligence is not the standard for
design defect claims is supported by the fact that subsection
(1)(a) does not include language like that found in subsection
(1)(c) .... Put simply, the Legislature evidently doubted that
what we termed "strict liability" in Tabert is, or should be
called, "strict liability."'' 25
Why the legislature's doubt in that regard should not be entitled
to deference is a question left unanswered in Falk. Where the WPLA
does use strict liability terminology, in subsection (2) (manufacture
defects and warranty breaches), that standard of liability is not
statutorily defined.1 26 What is statutorily defined in subsection (2)(a)
is the phrase "not reasonably safe in construction." '127 What is statu-
torily defined in subsection (2)(b) is the phrase "does not conform to
the express warranty.' ' 21 What is omitted from the strict liability sub-
sections is the risk-utility test. 29 Similarly, the word "negligence" is
not statutorily defined anywhere in the WPLA, although subsection
(1) would seem to demonstrate how a manufacturer's negligence
121. 102 Wash. 2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984).
122. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
123. Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977).
124. Lenhardt, 102 Wash. 2d at 214, 683 P.2d at 1101.
125. Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 653, 782 P.2d 974, 979 (1989) (emphasis
added).
126. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2) (2000).
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2)(a).
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2)(b).
129. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 (2000).
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manifests itself "in that the product was not reasonably safe as
designed... "130 The essential point that seems to have escaped both
the Falk and Soproni courts is that the statute provides for two dif-
ferent standards of liability, depending on which type of product defect
is alleged to have caused injury.
Rather than undertake a serious analysis of whether the court's
interpretation of the WPLA is a sound one, an examination that
would involve defending its selective construction of the statute's text
on the merits, the Soproni court rested on the broad principles of stare
decisis and legislative acquiescence.
Reviewing the court of appeals' decision and analysis, the major-
ity found fault with its overemphasis on Alpine's compliance with the
industry standards and fire codes.131 While conceding that compliance
with such standards is relevant and may be considered by the trier of
fact under the WPLA,132 the court stated that the court of appeals
improperly discounted the opinions of the plaintiffs experts. 33 The
experts' opinions should have been viewed in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff.'34 Had the experts' opinions been so viewed, said the
court, they would have established that feasible alternative designs
were available that "would have prevented the accident here without
violating applicable codes." '135 Affidavits such as those of Messrs.
Mitchell and Sloan, the court stated, have been considered sufficient
to survive summary judgment in other cases. 136  In one such case,
Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,'13 a flight attendant fell through
an escape hatch on a DC-10 airplane.'38 The plaintiffs expert, an en-
gineer, opined that the hatch cover was not reasonably safe and stated
that an alternative design manufactured by one of the defendant cor-
poration's competitors lacked the features deemed to be dangerous.3 9
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1).
131. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 328, 971 P.2d at 506 (1999).
132. Section 7.72.050(1) of the WPLA states:
Evidence of custom in the product seller's industry, technological feasibility or that
the product was or was not, in compliance with nongovernmental standards or with
legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory standards, whether
relating to design, construction or performance of the product or to warnings or
instructions as to its use may be considered by the trier of fact.
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050(1) (2000).
133. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 328, 971 P.2d at 506.
134. Id. at 328-29, 971 P.2d at 506.
135. Id. at 329, 971 P.2d at 506.
136. Id.
137. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d 345, 348, 588 P.2d 1346, 1348
(1979).
138. Id. at 348, 588 P.2d at 1348.
139. Id. at 352, 588 P.2d at 1350.
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However, the dissent in Soproni, authored by Justice Talmadge,
found Lamon unpersuasive and distinguishable. 4 The expert opinion
in Lamon was relevant to that case because the manufacturer "had full
control over all matters concerning the relative safety of the escape
hatch,... [insofar] [a]s only the plane's builder participated in decisions
which could potentially create a dangerous condition .. ."14 This
testimony, the Soproni dissent argued, raised a genuine factual issue
sufficient to survive summary judgment. 42 However, the testimony of
Messrs. Mitchell and Sloan in Soproni merely purported to demon-
strate that safer window designs exist, which the dissent maintained
was irrelevant because the dangerous condition was created not by
Alpine's design decision, but rather by the developer's decision to use
such a window "in [an] upper floor window seat. ",'4" Thus, the Soproni
expert opinion addressed an issue of great relevance to the developer's
and architect's liability-not to Alpine's-so summary judgment was
not precluded. 44 For that matter, proffering evidence of safer alterna-
tive designs only begins to lay the necessary foundation for a risk-
utility analysis under subparagraph 7.72.030(1)(a) of the WPLA. 4'
Plaintiffs must also show that the alternative design was practical,
feasible, and that it brought with it greater usefulness than adverse
effect.1
46
The Soproni majority also faulted the court of appeals for its
emphasis on the fact that Daniel's injuries did not result from an
intended or foreseeable use of the window. 147 Returning to its illogical
construction of the product liability statute, the majority challenged
the simple proposition that there is no duty to make a safe product
safer, concluding it was "not appropriate to a product liability claim
because strict liability rather than negligence is the standard for design
defect claims.' ', 41 With such obvious disregard for the express lang-
uage and reformist policy behind an important statute for product
manufacturers doing business in Washington, the majority's legal
reasoning could best be described as superficial.
140. Soproni, 137 Wash. 2d at 335 n.11, 971 P.2d at 509 n.4. The dissent's response to the
majority's reliance on the Lamon case is also confined to a lengthy footnote.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 336 n.ll, 971 P.2d at 510 n.4.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 336-37, 971 P.2d at 510.
146. Id. at 336, 971 P.2d at 510.
147. Id. at 330, 971 P.2d at 507.
148. Id.
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II. ANALOGOUS PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The Soproni case is unique. Few cases resemble the factual
scenario and legal analysis observed in Soproni. Indeed, a window
manufacturer was held liable to a plaintiff (where the plaintiff fell
through and out of window) in only one case, Honey v. Barnes
Hospital,'49 a Missouri Court of Appeals decision, which is fundamen-
tally distinguishable from the Soproni case, discussed briefly below.
Those cases coming closest to Soproni's facts resulted in contrary
holdings and are grounded in much more defensible rationales. In any
event, the purpose of discussing these cases is not so much to support
the author's contention that the Soproni court arrived at the wrong
outcome; rather, these cases demonstrate not only the degree to which
the Soproni court's rationale is flawed, but also that the means by
which such an outcome could be produced must be closely scruti-
nized.
A. Honey v. Barnes Hospital (Missouri)
Honey involved a wrongful death action brought by the parents
of a young man who was admitted into the Barnes Hospital's psychi-
atric intensive care ward.' The young man committed suicide by
jumping from the hospital's fifteenth-floor window, which an architect
had specified should be equipped with a secure, tamper-proof, locking
device and limit stops.'' Named as defendants in the case were the
hospital, the general contractor, the architect, and the window manu-
facturer.5 2 The plaintiffs in Honey alleged that the window manufac-
turer "negligently supplied windows without adequate tolerance to
allow locking" or limit stops.'53 A jury verdict for the plaintiffs
against the hospital, general contractor, and window manufacturer was
upheld on appeal. 4 On appeal, the window manufacturer asserted
that it "was told to go ahead and manufacture the window without
limit stops" by the architect."55 The Missouri Court of Appeals found
no evidence to that effect, and reasoned that the plaintiffs' theory of
recovery against the window manufacturer was based upon common
149. Honey v. Barnes Hosp., 708 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
150. Id. at 690.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 690-91. Also named as a defendant in the case was a "window subcontractor."
Id. at 691.
153. Id. at 691.
154. Id. at 690.
155. Id. at 702.
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law negligence." 6 In sum, the window manufacturer in Honey had full
knowledge of the specific setting in which its product would be used-
a psychiatric suicide-watch hospital ward on the fifteenth floor-and
was justly held liable for breaching its duty of care and proximately
causing the decedent's death.' The circumstances of Honey,
informed by common sense and logical reasoning, would just as easily
support a design defect product liability claim here in Washington
under the clear language of the WPLA' 58 The negligence standard of
liability, provided in subparagraph 7.72.030(1) of the WPLA, would
seem to have been designed for just such a claim. The circumstances
of Soproni, one could certainly argue, are susceptible to a claim under
that same provision of the WPLA; but the legal theory relied upon
would not fairly be characterized as strict liability. The legal theory
supporting such a claim would, as in the Honey case, be negligence-
based, especially given that product liability claims in Washington can
only be litigated pursuant to the WPLA."9
B. Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A. 6' (Seventh Circuit)
Two-year-old Tiffany Todd died when four-year-old Cori
Smith, playing with a Bic disposable lighter, started a fire in Tiffany's
bedroom. 6' About a week before the tragic incident, Cori had set a
small fire in her parents' bedroom while playing with the same type of
lighter, and was warned by her parents never to play with lighters or
matches.'62 Tiffany's estate sued Bic Corporation, the manufacturer
of the lighter, asserting negligence and strict liability claims, alleging
the lighter was defective because it was not made with a child-resistant
feature. 6 3 Before discovery was completed at the trial court level,
undisputed evidence showed that at the time of the fire Bic had devel-
oped a prototype lighter that did incorporate a child-resistant,
although not childproof, feature.'64 Bic moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that its product was not unreasonably dangerous to
consumers. 6 The trial court granted summary judgment for Bic on
156. Id. at 702-03.
157. Id.
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 (2000).
159. Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 112 Wash. 2d 847, 853, 774
P.2d 1199, 1203 (1989).
160. Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994).
161. Id. at 1403.
162. Id. at 1404.
163. Id. Plaintiff alleged both defective design and defective warning claims. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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all claims, finding that the lighter was not defective or unreasonably
dangerous. 166
On appeal before the full panel of the Seventh Circuit, the trial
court's order was affirmed. 67 The "seminal question" before the
court of appeals was: "what does an ordinary consumer expect when
he purchases a lighter?""16 In an attempt to answer that question in
such a way as to require reversal, the plaintiff/appellant in Todd
argued that Illinois law should extend the consumer contemplation
test to look to the expectations of all "foreseeable users," not just the
ordinary consumer. 69 However, the court found that both Illinois
common law and the Restatement Second of Torts, Section 402A,
clearly reject such an argument, holding instead that children are not
ordinary consumers.17 1 Moreover, it would be absurd to inquire into
the expectations of a two-year-old child using a consumer product,
given that small children cannot be expected to perceive the dangers
inherent in almost any product, much less "contemplate" anything.17 1
While Todd did not involve windows or screens, it did involve a
very common household product-a lighter-that the average con-
sumer likely would not characterize as "unreasonably" dangerous
merely because it is not completely childproof. The Todd court's dis-
tinction between a foreseeable user of a product-i.e., a 20-month-old
child-and the ordinary consumer, is overlooked by the Soproni court.
C. Brower v. Metal Industries 2 (Delaware)
In Brower, 11-month-old Shayne Townsend fell out of a second-
story bedroom window in the home of his aunt, sustaining injuries.'
At the time of the fall, Shayne was playing with his twin brother and
four cousins, ages one to nine, while his mother was downstairs
unpacking groceries. 74 Shayne's parents brought suit against Metal
Industries, Inc., the window manufacturer, alleging negligence, breach
166. Id. at 1405.
167. Id. at 1404.
168. Id. at 1407.
169. Id. at 1407-08. Bic conceded that it was foreseeable that a child might use a lighter,
but this was of very little value to the plaintiff since affixed to the lighter was a warning label
reading: KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN. However, the court of appeals found that
a concession that child use is foreseeable is not a concession that the product so used is
unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 1408 n.3.
170. Id. at 1408.
171. Id. at 1408-09.
172. Brower v. Metal Indus., 719 A.2d 941 (Del. 1998).
173. Id. at 943.
174. Id.
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of warranties, and strict liability. 7 ' The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant manufacturer, holding that it did not have
a duty to manufacture a screen that would have prevented Shayne
from falling out of the window.176 The court also held that the "vent-
stop" feature of the window did not give rise to a duty that would
otherwise not have existed'77 and that there was no basis for
submitting the issue of proximate cause to a trier of fact.'78 The
Supreme Court of Delaware agreed and affirmed the decision of the
trial court, finding that the defendant had no legal duty to prevent
Shayne's fall through the open window.'7 9
Although the defendant in Brower manufactured both the win-
dow and screen alleged to be defective, the plaintiffs arguments
focused on the design and manufacture of the window.' Sounding
more like a manufacturing defect claim, the plaintiff alleged that had
the window been manufactured properly, "as designed," Shayne
would not have fallen out of the window.'8 ' Presumably, the window
and screen should have been able to withstand any pressure that the
twenty-pound infant could have created.'82 In response, Metal Indus-
tries argued that the ordinary purpose of its window screens is to keep
insects out while letting in light and air-not to prevent small children
from falling out.'83
The plaintiff also argued that there was an "emerging recognition
of a limited duty to avoid foreseeable harm to children from defective
windows and screens."' 84  The Delaware Supreme Court found this
argument wanting in that it overlooked distinctions between the duties
owed by manufacturers, landlords, and innkeepers. 8 ' The court then
cited an analogous case brought before the Virginia Supreme Court
earlier that year, Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Gamble,'86 which involved another
infant's fall from a second-story window.'87 The Brower court found
the Jeld- Wen court's reasoning persuasive, and quoted with approval
175. Id. at 942, 942 n.1.
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187. Brower, 719 A.2d at 945 (quotingJeld-Wen, Inc., 501 S.E.2d at 397).
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the latter court's elaboration on the concept of duty in the products
liability field:
[T]he purpose of making the finding of a legal duty as a prere-
quisite to a finding of negligence, or a breach of implied war-
ranty, in products liability 'is to avoid the extension of liability
for every conceivably foreseeable accident, without regard to
common sense or good policy. " s8
D. Drager v. Aluminum Industries Corp.189 (Minnesota)
At the age of six years, William Drager fell back in his chair, dis-
lodged a screen, and fell out of a second-story apartment window,
sustaining severe injuries.190 Drager brought suit against the landlord
for negligence and against Aluminum Industries, the window screen
manufacturer, for defective design and failure to warn.'9 ' The trial
court granted summary judgment to the window manufacturer on the
grounds that it had no legal duty to design a screen that would have
prevented the plaintiffs fall.' 92  Interestingly, the landlord's motion
for summary judgment was denied due to the existence of a "genuine
issue of material fact as to whether [the landlord] maintained the
dwelling unit in a safe condition as set out in the Lease Agreement. 193
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota, in reviewing the plaintiffs
product liability claims, was presented with issues of first impres-
sion. "'94 Finding no cases in which screen manufacturers were held
liable for injuries resulting from falls through window screens, the
court was inclined to join those jurisdictions holding to the contrary. 195
Nonetheless, the court stated that in determining whether a product is
defective, Minnesota courts apply a "reasonable care balancing
test." '196 Primarily a common law rule, this balancing test holds a
manufacturer to that degree of care that avoids any "unreasonable risk
of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the
product is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as well
as an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use."' 97 As if in answer to
188. Id. (quoting Pineda v. Ennabe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 209 (1998)).
189. 495 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
190. Id. at 881.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 881-82.
193. Id. at 882 (alteration in original).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 883-84.
196. Id. at 882 (quoting Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d 352, 356
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
197. Id. (quoting Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 578 (N.Y. 1976)) (emphasis
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the Soproni argument that summary judgment and fact-intensive
product liability claims rarely coexist, the Drager court then stated
that, "[g]enerally, the question of whether a product is defective is a
question of fact; however, where reasonable minds cannot differ, the
question becomes one of law." 98
Courts in several other jurisdictions have reached substantially
the same conclusions as shown above, all of them refusing to extend
liability to window manufacturers for the injuries to persons falling
through them.'99 Whether grounded on an analysis of the consumer
expectations test, a risk-utility test, or both, and whether based upon
the construction of a statute or common law rule, the outcome has
been the same: an open window is not defective merely because a
human being will fall out of one on occasion any more than a roof is
defective because human beings have been known to fall from them.
III. CONCLUSION: AN APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE
We Americans are fortunate to live in an age and a world where
we are surrounded with modern conveniences and electrical appli-
ances. Our homes are literally filled with gadgets. Yet any wise
parent knows that childproofing the home and all of the products
found there cannot be simply left to the manufacturers of those prod-
ucts. Doorknobs would be considerably more expensive if their man-
ufacturers were expected to design against young children being able
to turn them; knives would made with plastic blade guards that could
only be detached by dexterous adults; we might even soon see wall
sockets with combination locks affixed to them.
To be sure, there is a demand for safe products, and the modern
parent seeks out those that seem to offer the best quality at the lowest
price; this often means that safety is a factor given a bit less considera-
tion than it deserves. Nevertheless, that level of safety most often
deemed sufficient for most adults is usually the one at which manufac-
turers start. The modern world is, in most respects, filled with
thousands of products designed appropriately for reasonably safe use
by adults. Those of us who choose to raise children should have the
common sense to know that childproofing the home is fundamentally
our own responsibility, not that of product manufacturers. Were this
not so, adults without children would be the ones tinkering with each
added).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Stokes, 117 P.2d 396 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Lamkin v.
Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990); Chelefou v. Springfield Inst. for Sav., 8 N.E.2d 769 (Mass.
1937); Egan v. Krueger, 135 A. 811 (N.J. 1927); Potter v. Southwestern Associated Tel. Co., 248
S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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new product after the purchase to make it more usable and convenient.
This would also unnecessarily increase the cost of just about every-
thing. In short, the marketplace for products caters to the lowest
common denominator because businesses want to reach the most con-
sumers at the lowest price and consumers want the greatest amount of
goods for the lowest price. Those who add children to the mix have
the responsibility to upgrade the safety of their homes.
Certainly, we could increase the safety features of both windows
and screens by equipping them with heavy duty locks, clips, and other
childproof features. But we could be equally certain that tomorrow's
plaintiffs will be the estates of elderly persons who lacked the strength
and dexterity to extricate themselves from burning apartments be-
cause the windows were too difficult to open. Moreover, until the fire
codes and industry standards are changed to permit such alternatives,
no manufacturer in Washington is going to risk designing childproof
windows. What needs to be changed is not codes and standards, but
rather the judicial activism that five members of the Washington
Supreme Court have been exhibiting for the past decade.
The people of Washington spoke clearly through the Legisla-
ture's enactment of tort and product liability reform in the carefully
drafted WPLA. Since its enactment, however, the Washington
Supreme Court has twice interpreted the statute's negligence standard
interchangeably with strict liability. At the same time, the court has
read the risk-utility test and the consumer expectations test as alterna-
tives for one another, leaving it up to the court and the trier of fact to
make an ad hoc determination as to which test provides the better
definition of the words "not reasonably safe." By construing the prod-
uct liability statute this way, the court has subverted the very end
sought to be achieved by the WPLA's passage, an end for which the
proper means was deemed a "firmer liability foundation," and an end
for which so many interested parties fought so hard to craft the legisla-
tive solution. Where is the "firmer foundation of liability" to be
found, if negligence means the same thing as strict liability? How will
Washington businesses and their product liability insurers assess the
risks posed by products sold and used here, given the court's insist-
ence that the product liability statute does not mean what it clearly
says?
These are important questions that should be given serious con-
sideration by the state legislature once again, twenty years after the
inception of the WPLA. However, a much more fundamental and
probing question should occur to Washington attorneys, judges, and
legal scholars: do the principles of stare decisis and legislative acqui-
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escence justify the court's construction of the WPLA, or has the
equally important principle of judicial restraint become so passe for
five of its Justices that the substance of state legislation must now be
subjected to "reasoned judgment"? If the latter is the case, any invita-
tion the author may submit for legislative resolution in the form of
amending the statute would likely be of little effect. If the former is
the case, perhaps the author harbors an underdeveloped sense of the
proper dimensions of the role of the judiciary, and an anachronistic
advocacy for the merits of restrained jurisprudence. In either case, the
questions need to be asked.
